

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 060205
ORIGIN AF-08

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 EUR-12 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 ACDA-07 MCT-01
DHA-02 AID-05 PC-01 TRSE-00 OMB-01 /090 R

DRAFTED BY: AF/C:EMARKS:IO/UNP:GBHELMAN
APPROVED BY: P:PCHABIB
AF:WESCHAUFEELE
EUR/WE:JFDOBBINS
EUR/NE:RWOODS
AF/C:TRBUCHANAN
S/S:RPERITO

-----180339Z 099996 /61

O 180210Z MAR 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 060205

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, CG

SUBJECT: SHABA INVASION: GOZ PROPOSAL TO REQUEST OAU
INVESTIGATION

REF: KINSHASA 2414

1. AMBASSASOR SHOULD COMMENT AS FOLLOWS ON PROGRAM OF
DIPLOMATIC ACTION DESCRIBED REFTTEL:

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-- OVERALL, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOZ PLAN OF DIPLOMATIC
ACTION IS SENSIBLE.

-- PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IS GOZ STRONG INITIAL EFFORT
TO ENCOURAGE THE OAU TO PLAY ROLE BEFORE CONSIDERING
UN SECURITY COUNCIL. IN THE PAST, AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS
HAVE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN

PROBLEMS AND HAVE NOT BROUGHT THEM TO UN. THUS, EVENTUAL RESORT TO THE UN WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTED BY AFRICANS ONLY IF EFFORT IN OAU CONTEXT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL WIDESPREAD AFRICAN SUPPORT IN SC WOULD BE NECESSARY (BECAUSE OF SOVIET VETO AND USUAL NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT OF MAJORITY AFRICAN VIEWPOINT) TO GET SC ACTION WHICH GOZ MIGHT WANT.

-- IF THE OAU FAILS TO ACT, OR IF OAU EFFORT NOT EFFECTIVE, AT THAT POINT GOZ MIGHT WANT TO TURN TO THE SC. IN THAT EVENT, GOZ CHANCES FOR SUCCESS WILL DEPEND UPON HAVING FAIRLY STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS NIGERIA, TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA.

-- THERE ARE SEVERAL STEPS WHICH GOZ MIGHT TAKE IN UN CONTEXT SHORT OF GOING TO THE SC WHICH COULD BE OF ASSISTANCE IN A DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN. FOR EXAMPLE, GOZ MIGHT INSTRUCT ITS PERMREP AT UN TO CALL ON UNSYG WALDHEIM TO INFORM HIM OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SHABA AND OF THEIR PLANS TO CALL ON OAU, TO ASK HIS ADVICE ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED IN UN CONTEXT AND WHAT ASSISTANCE SYG MIGHT RENDER. GOZ SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WALDHEIM MIGHT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE CERTAIN STEPS ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY, SUCH AS URGING KEY AFRICAN STATES (E.G. NIGERIA, TANZANIA, TOGO AS CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) TO GET OAU INVESTIGATION AND MEDIATION EFFORT UNDER WAY PROMPTLY, BUT IS ONLY LIKELY TO DO SO IF HE HAS INFORMAL AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR SUCH A MOVE. IF GOZ SHOULD INITIATE SUCH AN APPROACH TO WALDHEIM, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE OUR SUPPORT AND TALK WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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WALDHEIM.

-- AS TO THE INVESTIGATION TEAM GOZ HAS IN MIND, WE SEE NO PROBLEM WITH THE OAU MOUNTING SUCH AN OPERATION. WE WOULD WANT TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE PROPOSAL SHOULD IT BE PUT BEFORE THE SC TO ASSURE THAT THE MANDATE GIVEN THE INVESTIGATING TEAM RECEIVES THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FROM THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. IN THAT CONNECTION, AGAIN, GENERAL AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION WOULD BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE.

2. GOZ MIGHT WISH CONSIDER KEEPING OAU PRESIDENT RAMGOOLAN AND SEC-GEN ETEKI DIRECTLY AND FULLY INFORMED OF REQUEST MADE VIA TOGOLESE CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

3. NEXT, DOES MOBUTU BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR A DIRECT USG APPROACH TO OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS (E.G. NIGERIA, TANZANIA, CAMEROON, SUDAN) TO EXPRESS

OUR CONCERN ABOUT A SITUATION SO OPEN TO OUTSIDE
INTERVENTION, AND OUR SUPPORT FOR AN AFRICAN SOLUTION?

4. DO MOBUTU OR NGUZA HAVE ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR
WAYS IN WHICH USG COULD USEFULLY SUPPORT THEIR DIPLOMATIC
PROGRAM?

5. FOR PARIS, BRUSSELS, LONDON AND BONN: PLEASE INFORM
HOST GOVERNMENTS OF OUR REPLY TO GOZ AS GIVEN ABOVE
AND ASK THEM FOR THEIR REACTIONS TO MOBUTU'S REQUEST

FOR ADVICE. ALSO INFORM THEM OF USG WILLINGNESS TO
SUPPORT GOZ REQUEST TO SYG WALDHEIM, ASK WHETHER THEY
MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO SAME, AND WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY
OTHER IDEAS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DIPLOMATIC ACTION WHICH
MIGHT BE TAKEN COLLECTIVELY OR BILATERALLY. FINALLY,
USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FOR THEIR LATEST EVALUATION
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OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN SHABA.
WITH BELGIANS, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED SPECIFICALLY TO
OBTAIN GOZ'S MOST AUTHORITATIVE EVALUATION OF SITUATION
IN ZAIRE, IN LIGHT OF CONFLICTING REPORTS OF BELGIAN
OFFICIAL VIEWS.
CHRISTOPHER

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ORIGIN AF-02

INFO OCT-01 EUR-02 ISO-00 /005 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: AF/C:AARENALES

APPROVED BY: AF/C:TRBUCHANAN

-----222356Z 046248 /70

O 222325Z MAR 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 060205

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 060205 ACTION KINSHASA BRUSSELS
PARIS USUN ADDIS ABABA DTD 18 MAR

QTE

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CHRISTOPHER UNQTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, POLICIES, INTERVENTION, RESOLUTIONS, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, INVASIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Drafter: AF/C:EMARKS:IO/UNP:GBHELMAN
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Office: ORIGIN AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 KINSHASA 2414
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
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Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3064480
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SHABA INVASION: GOZ PROPOSAL TO REQUEST OAU INVESTIGATION
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, CG, US, OAU
To: KINSHASA BRUSSELS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e3faedb5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
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